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Abstract
Little is known about how individuals make decisions when they must choose several
options from a set of options when the outcomes are risky and the payoffs are rival.
When researchers model these decisions, they assume people maximize their expected
utility. We design an experiment in which subjects face either rival or independent
payoffs. While theory predicts different behavior, subjects behave nearly identically
under these payoff schemes. This suggests individuals are not maximizing expected
utility. Additional treatments demonstrate that this behavior is likely driven by a
heuristic used to simplify a complex math problem, rather than a preference for lotteries
with the highest independent expected utilities. Our results suggest that using expected
utility as peoples’ objective function in these types of environments will lead to biased
predictions.
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1 Introduction
Individuals are often faced with decisions in which they have to select several options from
a larger set despite winning at most one of the selected options. Examples of these types of
decisions include selecting which colleges to apply to, which jobs to apply to, and which job
candidates to fly out for an in-person interview. What makes this environment unique is that
the decision maker is selecting options that are risky and have rival outcomes. The options
are risky in that the they follow known probabilities.1 The options are rival in that the
decision maker’s realized outcome is the single most favorable of all options. Little is known
about how individuals make decisions in such settings. In applications where researchers
have analyzed behavior, expected utility maximization is often assumed (Chade et al., 2013;
Fu, 2014). We test this assumption experimentally. We find significant evidence of behavior
inconsistent with expected utility maximization. This result is important as it improves our
understanding of decision making and has many policy implications.
The type of decision making environment we are exploring is common and relates to many
matching markets. A common example for economists is a stylized version of the demand
side of the economics job market. For the unfamiliar, after interviewing job candidates at
the centralized meetings, hiring committees must choose which candidates to invite for a
campus visit while knowing that: (A) their payoff is the value added of the best candidate
who accepts the offer and (B) they usually can only invite a small number of the candidates
to visit. The school’s decision problem is which candidates to invite? Some candidates are
likely to add a lot of value but are less likely to accept an offer on account of receiving better
offers. Other candidates are likely to add less value but would be more likely to accept an
offer.
To solve this problem and others like it, we demonstrate theoretically how expected
utility is maximized in environments where options are rival and independent (i.e., one
1We abstract from the fact that in many actual decisions the probabilities will depend on the behavior
of other individuals.
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option is randomly selected and payoffs are dependent on the outcome of the randomly
selected option). We show that in either case, when an agent is allowed to select one option,
out of many, the agent will select the option that maximizes her expected utility. When
agents are allowed to select more than one option from the same set, the optimal selection
(i.e., portfolio of options) depends on whether or not the outcomes of these options are rival.
When outcomes are not rival, agents will select the options with the highest independent
expected utilities. When outcomes are rival, agents will select only options that are weakly
riskier than their initial option (lotteries in our experiment and hereafter).
We next test whether or not subjects in an incentivized experiment choose differently
when outcomes are rival compared to when they are independent. In our experiment there
are two payment schemes. In one scheme, outcomes are rival and subjects are paid on the
basis of the most favorable outcome from the lotteries selected. In the other scheme, outcomes
are independent and subjects are paid based on the outcome of a randomly chosen lottery
from the set of selected lotteries. We also alter the number of lotteries subjects are able to
choose. If subjects are maximizing expected utility the two payment rules predict different
behavior as the number of lotteries the subject is allowed to choose increases. Simulations
and theory demonstrate that when the lotteries are rival, subjects should not pick any lottery
safer than the lottery they would pick when they are allowed to only select one lottery. When
lotteries are not rival however, the optimal portfolio of lotteries is made up of lotteries that
are riskier and safer than her lottery selection when she is only allowed to pick one. We find
that subjects in both cases pick safer lotteries as the number of choices increases. As we will
demonstrate, this is strong evidence that subjects are not maximizing expected utility when
outcomes are rival and suggests the common assumption of expected utility maximization
often held by applied microeconomists in this particular environment is questionable.
Our experiments show that when people are faced with a single choice many, if not
most, maximize expected utility. However, when faced with more than one rival choice, few
subjects make selections that maximize expected utility. Rather, subjects tend to make se-
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lections that offer the highest independent payoffs. This type of decision making is consistent
with a “picking favorites” heuristic which does not require any complex calculations - only
knowledge of the independent expected value of each lottery. In a follow-up experiment, we
test whether this behavior is a preference or a heuristic by informing subjects of the exact
bundle of lotteries that maximizes the expected value. We find a plurality of subjects select
the expected value maximizing bundle. Moreover, the fraction of subjects who select this
bundle is not statistically different from the fraction of subjects who selected the expected
value maximizing bundle when they are only allowed to select one lottery from the set.
We show that risk aversion is not an explanation, as all but the most risk loving agents will
make riskier selections as the number of choices increases. While we do find some evidence
inconsistent with the hypothesis that subjects are making decisions as if the outcomes are
independent, we demonstrate this deviation is likely due to a diversification bias (e.g., Read
and Loewenstein, 1995; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Fox et al., 2005; Fernandes, 2013). Finally
we demonstrate that Reference Dependent Utility (RDU), as in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), can explain subjects’ behavior, but only for implausible values of the loss parameter.
Our primary result is that subjects appear to behave in a manner consistent with treating
the outcomes as independent, rather than interdependent. This behavior is likely not based
on a preference for only selecting outcomes with the highest expected utility but rather a
result of a heuristic used to solve a hard problem. Moreover, this heuristic is used even
when subjects are given experience, detailed instructions, and precise expected values - all of
which are unlikely to be given in other environments. Our findings are consistent with Pallais
(2015) which examines a policy change in which the average number of college applications
per student increases. She finds that “when students sent more score reports, they sent
scores to a wider range of colleges: that is, those that were both more- and less-selective
than any they would have sent scores to otherwise.”(Pallais, 2015, p. 503) This behavior is
inconsistent with expected utility maximization and consistent with our finding that subjects
in this type of environment make choices as if the outcomes independent rather than rival.
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2 Experiment
We design an experiment to study decision making with rival risky outcomes. We do so
using lotteries in which people earn only the maximum winning prize from all lotteries they
select. Here, the outcomes are rival as subjects are required to take the maximum payout.
A justifiable assumption as one normally takes the best date to the dance, accepts the best
job offer, or enrolls in the best school while also pulling from a “realistic” distribution of
potential dates/jobs/schools.2 Although different in many regards, each of these are cases
of rival outcomes.
Real world decisions also involve a strategic component to the decision problem tak-
ing into account the decisions of other applicants. Our experiment simplifies the decision
problem by making the probabilities for each lottery exogenous thus eliminating strategic
considerations. We believe this a reasonable assumption given that in many cases the appli-
cant pool is sufficiently large and relatively homogeneous - which would suggest the outcomes
have a large random component.
2.1 Experiment Design
In the experiment, we vary the number of choices subjects have and the payment rule. Pay-
ments are either RIVAL and based on the maximum successful outcome, or RANDOM and
based on one randomly selected lottery. Regardless of how we pay subjects, subjects partic-
ipate in sessions where they choose 1, 2, 4, or 6 lotteries from the set of 20 lotteries shown in
Table 1. Subjects observe each lottery’s prize and the probability of winning. Moreover, to
prevent a conflation between lottery selection and the ability to calculate expected values,
we present each lottery’s expected value.3
2For example, when selecting what college to apply to, students, of all quality types, may apply to schools
which they are not likely to be admitted into and schools which they are very likely to be admitted into.
Presumably, the schools in which they are not likely to be admitted into have a higher return to a degree
while those that are less selective provide lower returns.
3As a robustness check, we later remove expected values and have a different set of subjects participate
in a session with 4 choices. Results can be found in Figure O.4 in the Online Appendix. There are no
significant differences.
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Table 1: Lotteries Used in Experiment
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
Prob .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .35 .40 .45 .50 .55 .60 .65 .70 .75 .80 .85 .90 .95 1.00
Prize 5.00 4.75 4.50 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.25
EV 0.25 0.48 0.68 0.85 1.00 1.13 1.23 1.30 1.35 1.38 1.38 1.35 1.30 1.23 1.13 1.00 0.85 0.68 0.48 0.25
Notes: Prizes and Expected Values (EV) are in US dollars.
For ease of exposition we refer to treatments using both payment rule (RANDOM or
RIVAL) and the given number of choices (1, 2, 4, and 6). As such, we have 7 treatments
because 1|RIVAL and 1|RANDOM have identical payment rules. We also index the lotteries
from 1 to 20 to simplify the coming analysis. Lotteries lower in number are riskier but have
a higher payout. However in the experiment we label lotteries by letters.
We conduct experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT is an online work-
place where workers (or subjects, in context of the experiment) can complete tasks for wages.4
Prior to starting the main task, subjects consent to participate then complete a short sur-
vey that includes two expected value questions and English comprehension questions.5 For
participating, we pay subjects a base wage of 25 cents. Subjects can only participate once
which can be verified by their unique AMT worker id number. We view AMT as occupying
the middle ground between field and lab experiments. This is because AMT has a somewhat
controlled environment (but not as much as a lab) with a diverse population in a familiar
environment, like a field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004).6
In addition to the base wage, subjects earn a bonus contingent on the outcome of their
lottery choices and payment rule. In RIVAL sessions, for each lottery a subject chooses,
we generate a uniform random number between 0 and 1. A number less than or equal
to the probability of winning the lottery results in the lottery having a favorable outcome
for the subject. If the randomly generated number exceeds the probability of winning the
4For more details about AMT see Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) and Cooper and Johnson
(2013).
5Ideally, we would have preferred to conduct the survey after the main experiment however the require-
ment that subjects be able to comprehend English required us to begin with the survey. This should not
bias results as it occurs in all treatments.
6Given the diversity of our subject pool we are especially confident our results generalize to the population
as a whole. However, we also find that demographics have little influence on subject behavior.
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lottery, the lottery results in an unfavorable outcome for the subject. The subject then
receives payment equal to the maximum favorable outcome across her selected lotteries. In
RANDOM sessions, we randomly select a chosen lottery, and generate a uniform random
number. If the number exceeds the probability of winning the lottery, the lottery result
is unfavorable for the subject. The other lotteries the subject selected (regardless of their
outcome) do not affect the subject’s final earnings.
After selecting their lotteries, but before we reveal outcomes, we ask subjects to indicate
what they consider to be the best and worst lotteries from the 20 possible lotteries. We
assume that subjects view their favorite lottery as the best and denote this lottery as their
“Favorite”. While identifying these lotteries, subjects see which lotteries they selected but are
unconstrained by their actual selections. Finally, subjects complete a short questionnaire
consisting of a demographic survey, un-incentivized risk preference questions, the Barrat
impulsivity scale (Patton et al., 1995), and a Ellsberg paradox task, explained in Appendix
A.2.
We ask subjects multiple risk preference questions across various domains but we are
primarily interested in responses to the most general question. All questions come from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (Burkhauser and Wagner, 1993; Schupp and Wagner, 2002),
with the following wording:
How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Subjects answer the question above using an 11 point scale ranging from 0 to 10 - with 0
being “I avoid risk” and 10 being “Fully prepared to take risks”. We use this question because
Dohmen et al. (2011) shows that this specific risk question provides “a reliable predictor of
actual risky behavior”. Moreover, we repeatedly find that this question significantly predicts
subjects’ decisions and that the estimated coefficients are always consistent with theoretical
predictions. Subjects that are more prepared to take risks select riskier lotteries.
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3 Theory
Decision maker j’s utility is determined by the outcome of a subset of k lotteries (l) chosen
from the set L, where k is the number of lotteries j can pick. The lotteries in L (indexed
by i), vary by their unconditional probability (pi) of paying a prize (wi).
7 The lotteries are
Bernoulli random variables, with outcomes wi with probability pi and 0 with probability
1− pi. j is not allowed to pick the same lottery twice. The utility from winning prize wi is
denoted as v(wi) and is continuous as well as increasing in wi. The indexing of wi and pi
is also of importance. Note that wi > wi+1 and pi < pi+1 ∀i which implies that the riskier
lotteries (i.e., lotteries with lower probabilities of winning) offer greater prizes than safer
lotteries.
3.1 Expected Utility Maximization (EU)
Unsurprisingly, an expected utility maximizing strategy results in j choosing a bundle to
maximize her expected utility. When outcomes are rival, the probability of winning each
outcome is a function of joint probabilities, and thus calculating the expected value of a
bundle is a non-trivial task for decision makers. To begin, we denote ψi as the realization
of the stochastic variable determining the success or failure of lottery i. Ii(.) is an indicator
function equal to 1 if ψi ≤ pi and zero otherwise. Since j’s utility is solely a function of the
utility derived from the lottery with the highest ex-post payout, j’s utility is written as,
U = max{v(wi)Ii(ψi ≤ pi) ∀ i ∈ k}. (1)
7We say “unconditional” because, in the primary treatments, subject j is only paid for the outcome of,
at most, one of the lotteries - the one most favorable to her.
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As ψi is uniform the probability that Ii(.) = 1 is pi. In expectation, j’s expected utility can
be written as,
E[Uj] = p1v(w1) + (1− p1)p2v(w2) + (1− p1)(1− p2)p3v(w3)...+
k−1∏
i=1
(1− pi)pkv(wk) (2)
which can be rewritten as,
E[Uj] =
k∑
i=1
(
i−1∏
h=1
(1− ph−1)× piv(wi)
)
, (3)
where k is the number of choices and p0 = 0.
With the previous assumptions it is easy to see that if j maximizes expected utility
(E[U ]), the initial lottery selection with k = 1 will be the lottery with the max E[U ]. We
denote this lottery l1∗.8 If j is more risk loving, l1? is riskier. If she is more risk averse, l1?
is safer. Since the distribution of the lotteries’ E[U ] are single peaked, it implies j’s first
selection will be the lottery which maximizes her E[U ]. With k = 2 we now show that j will
select an additional lottery that is riskier than her lottery selection when k = 1 but awards
a higher prize if won.
Consider a continuum of lotteries, which exist along a straight line in the pi, wi plane.
In the context of the experiment, the slope of this line is −5 with lotteries (p, w) ranging
from (0.00, 5.25) to (1.00, 0.25). With some loss of generality, consider choosing among a set
of three lotteries, l1∗, l1, and l′1, where l
1∗ is the lottery chosen when k = 1. We define these
8In the context of the experiment, we assume that this lottery is the subject’s favorite or the lottery they
regard as the best.
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lotteries by:
l1∗ = p∗v(w∗), l1 = p1v(w1), and l′1 = p
′
1v(w
′
1)
where
θ < 1 & (1 + θ)p∗ < 1
p1 = (1− θ)p∗, w1 = v−1((1 + θ)v(w∗))
p′1 = (1 + θ)p∗, w
′
1 = v
−1((1− θ)v(w∗))
(4)
The probability that l1 awards a favorable outcome for j is (1 − θ) percent less than
the probability that l1∗ rewards the favorable outcome. However, l1 delivers utility that is θ
percent more if the favorable outcome occurs. Alternatively, lottery l′1, results in θ percent
less utility upon the occurrence of the favorable outcome. This loss in monetary winnings
is fully compensated with a θ percent increase in the probability of the favorable outcome
occurring. Thus E[U(l1∗)] > E[U(l1)] = E[U(l′1)] which is graphically illustrated in Figure
1.
Figure 1: Expected Utility of l1, l0, & l
′
1
With three lotteries in the choice set, we consider what the individual would pick when
choosing 1, 2, or 3 lotteries if maximizing expected utility. The preferred bundle when
choosing 3 lotteries is trivial, as she would choose all available lotteries. The preferred
bundle with one choice is also straightforward; lottery l1∗ has the highest expected utility
and would thus be chosen.
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The choice with a bundle of two is more complicated. The individual has the option of
choosing (l1∗, l1), (l1∗, l′1), or (l1, l
′
1). We now demonstrate that the individual would choose
(l1∗, l1). We do this by demonstrating that (l1∗, l1)  (l′1, l1) and that (l1∗, l1)  (l1∗, l′1).
In comparing (l1∗, l1) and (l′1, l1), consider what happens when the outcomes of the lot-
teries are realized. Recall that l1 is the lottery with the highest payout. If either bundle
is selected, and l1 is successful, then she would enjoy v(w1) and the outcome of the other
lottery is irrelevant as both award a payoff less than w1. If l1 is unsuccessful, then the payout
received will solely depend on either l1∗ or l′1. As E[U(l
1∗)] > E[U(l′1)], she would choose the
bundle containing l1∗, thus (l1∗, l1)  (l′1, l1).
We now compare the bundles (l1∗, l1) and (l1∗, l′1). In this case, the comparison is a bit less
straight forward as the two bundles no longer share the lottery with the highest prize. One
bundle (l1∗, l1) contains a relatively risky lottery (i.e., riskier than l1∗) that will matter with
certainty because it offers the highest prize. The other bundle (l1∗, l′1) contains a relatively
safe lottery but this lottery will only matter if l1∗ is unfavorable. In other words, bundle
(l1∗, l′1) offers a safe backup lottery if the highest paying lottery fails, while bundle (l
1∗, l1)
offers a higher paying lottery that will matter with certainty.
We now demonstrate that (l1∗, l1)  (l1∗, l′1) by way of proof by contradiction. First
assume that the E[U(l1∗, l1)] < E[U(l1∗, l′1)]. In terms of expected utilities, this can be
written as,
E[U(l1)] + (1− p1)E[U(l1∗)] < E[U(l1∗)] + (1− p∗)E[U(l′1)] (5)
Which can be further rewritten in terms of θ, p∗, and w∗:
(1− θ)p∗(1 + θ)v(w∗) + (1− (1− θ)p∗)p∗v(w∗) <
p∗v(w∗) + (1− p∗)(1 + θ)p∗(1− θ)v(w∗) (6)
However, this implies that 1 < θ while θ is defined as less than one, so we have a proof by
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contradiction and therefore (l1∗, l1)  (l1∗, l′1). Thus when faced with the bundle choices of
(l1∗, l1) and (l1∗, l′1), she will choose bundle (l
1∗, l1). That bundle will include a riskier lottery
when compared with the bundle with only one choice.
Proposition 1 Assuming a continuous distribution of lotteries, increasing the number
of choices will lead to j choosing lotteries which are riskier than the lottery chosen with only
one choice.
The exercise above provides some intuition to the general decision making process. To
illustrate, consider adding a lottery (lr) to an existing bundle of k lotteries, Bk, and denote
the new lottery bundle as Br. Lottery lr is riskier and has a higher payoff, if successful, than
any other lottery in Bk. Alternatively, consider adding a lottery ls to the existing bundle,
Bk (where E[U(ls)] = E[U(lr)]), and denote this new bundle Bs.
Because the lotteries are interdependent, we can think of the payoff function as having
a set of stopping rules, which begins by sorting all of the selected lotteries in bundles Br
and Bs by their payoffs, if favorable, in descending order. Consequently, each lottery is only
relevant if all the previous lotteries offering higher prizes (if favorable) are unfavorable, which
occurs with probability,
ωi = (1− p1)(1− p2)....(1− pi−1) (7)
This means that lr will be relevant with probability ωr and ls will be relevant with probability
ωs. Since the expected utilities of lr and ls are equal, j is better off selecting lr since ωr > ωs.
Note that this line of reasoning rules out any lottery that is safer than the lottery j would
pick when k = 1. This is because for any lottery safer than the expected utility maximizing
lottery when k = 1 there also exists a riskier lottery with an equal expected utility. Because
this riskier alternative always will have a higher probability of being relevant, choosing the
risky alternative will always dominate the safe choice.
Proposition 2 Increasing the number of choices increases j’s expected utility.
The likelihood that j wins 0 from her chosen bundle is
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k∏
i=1
(1− pi), (8)
which decreases in k, the number of lotteries that j can pick. Moreover, any additional
lottery only increases j’s utility as each additional lottery is adding a positive component to
Equation 3 - thus increasing expected utility.
3.2 Expected Utility Maximization as if Independent (EU-I)
Alternatively, j may select lotteries in reference to her favorite lottery (l1?) which is the
lottery that maximizes her expected utility. As before, if j is more risk loving, l1? is riskier.
If she is more risk averse, l1? is safer. Subsequently selected lotteries are then based upon
the difference in the expected utility between l1? and the second most preferred lottery.
In other words, j selects her k favorite lotteries from the set L where L is defined as
L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}
with payoffs
li = piv(wi).
Her selected lotteries are a subset of L made up of k elements such that l? ∈ L, with
l? = {l1?, l2?, . . . , lk?}.
Therefore, the first step in j’s decision process identifies the lottery which maximizes her
utility and satisfies
l1? = max{l1, l2, ..., ln}. (9)
Once she selects l1?, j then selects the lottery most similar to her first choice in expected
utility, and therefore selecting the lottery offering the second highest expected utility. This
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minimizes the absolute difference between the expected utility of her first choice and her
second choice, such that
l2? = min{|l1 − l1?|, |l2 − l1?|..., |ln − l1?| : l2? 6= l?}.
This decision rule also maximizes expected utility if all the lotteries contributed to her final
earnings or were independent. She goes through this process k times (or the given number
of choices) until she arrives at a bundle that minimizes the sum of the differences in payoffs
between l1? and her subsequent choices,
lk? = min{|l1 − l1?|, |l2 − l1?|..., |ln − l1?| : lk? 6= lk?−1}. (10)
With a continuum of lotteries, these would be the k lotteries closest in E[U ] to the E[U(l1?)].
4 Simulation Results
4.1 Expected Utility
While the foregoing discussion considered a continuum of lotteries, our experiment naturally
involves a set of discrete lotteries. Solving for the optimal bundle as k increases is burdensome
as there are N “choose” k permutations of lottery selections. The set of lotteries, L, in the
experiment can be found in Table 1. We solve for the optimal bundle in our experiment
numerically, by calculating the subsets of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 lotteries that maximize j’s
expected utility. Note, in all of these numerically solved bundles we are assuming exponential
utility (i.e., v(wi) = w
α
i ). However, general results also hold for Constant Relative Risk
Aversion specifications (Dyer and Sarin, 1982). With very minor differences related to the
spread between the riskiest lottery and the utility maximizing lottery.
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Figure 2: Expected Utility Maximizing Choices with Various Risk Preferences
Notes: RL and RA indicate a risk loving (α = 2) and risk averse (α = .5) decision maker.
Figure 2 demonstrates how risk preferences affect the optimal bundle under EU. As can
be seen in Figure 2, when α increases the selected portfolios j selects shift in the direction
of riskier lotteries and the choices are less disperse. Conversely, as α decreases the selected
portfolios shift towards safer lotteries and the dispersion increases.
Figure 2 illustrates other predictable results: (1) Increasing the number of choices in-
creases expected utility because adding a lottery results in a nonzero probability of winning
a specific amount. If the new lottery’s payout is greater than the current highest payout in
the existing bundle, the additional, higher paying lottery simply gives the decision maker a
chance at a higher prize. In the event of an unfavorable outcome of the new lottery, the con-
ditional expected utility is unchanged in comparison to the previous bundle. (2) Increasing
the number of choices weakly increases the maximum riskiness of the lotteries j selects.
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4.2 Expected Utility Maximization as if Independent (EU-I)
We next simulate choice bundles that maximize EU-I as a function of the given number of
choices, while also varying risk preferences. The results are in Figure 3. As with EU, risk
preferences shift the initial lottery j picks. That is, more risk averse agents pick a safer initial
lottery and risk loving agents select a riskier initial lottery. However, there are substantive
differences in choices between the two decision rules. Most notably, under EU-I, j selects
roughly equal numbers of lotteries that are riskier and safer than their initial pick. Under
EU, this is not the case since j only selects lotteries that are riskier. In essence, EU-I does
not take into account the rival nature of the lotteries, but instead treats lotteries as “next
best” outcomes.
Figure 3: EU-I Maximizing Choices under Various Risk Preferences
Notes: RL and RA indicate a risk loving (α = 2) and risk averse (α = .5) decision maker.
5 Hypotheses
The theoretical discussion leads to testable hypotheses which are stated in terms of the null.
Recall that under EU, j will select k − 1 lotteries riskier than l∗. If EU types dominate
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the population, we expect to observe an increase in the number of risky lottery selections
as j receives more choices - which would drive down the average index number of lotteries
selected. This logic leads us to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 The riskiness of the average lottery selected will not be affected by the number
of choices.
Alternatively, a failure to reject the null of Hypothesis 1, is consistent with subjects
following EU-I as subjects pick roughly the same number of riskier and safer lotteries in
comparison to their initial lottery selection.
If subjects follow EU, the safest lottery should always be the choice subjects made when
given only one choice, l∗1. With EU-I, the safest choice will get safer as the number of choices
increases.
Hypothesis 2 The number of choices a subject receives has no effect on their safest lottery
selection.
Rejecting the null suggests subjects behave in manner consistent with EU-I.
Results in Section 4 suggest that the bundles selected will depend on subject’s risk
aversion. While we do not measure risk aversion using an incentivized mechanism, we do
test whether the unincentivized risk aversion question has any relevance for subjects’ behavior
and check whether stated preferences have any affect on average lottery selections and what
they regard as their favorite or least favorite (worst) lottery.
Hypothesis 3 Stated risk aversion preferences will have no affect on subjects’ lottery selec-
tions.
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6 Subject Characteristics and Behavioral Consistency
6.1 Subject Characteristics
Table 2 presents unconditional summary statistics of demographic characteristics and choices.
We gather information regarding the gender, age, education, country of residence, and in-
come of subjects. As expected, subjects in our experiment are more heterogeneous than
subjects in laboratory studies - especially in terms of age and education.9 Appendix A.1
contains the variable descriptions. The gender ratio of subjects is slightly unbalanced: 63
percent of subjects indicate they are male. The average age of subjects is 35 years. The
modal income of subjects is between $25,000 - $37,499 per year and the modal education is
a bachelor’s degree.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AMB 294 0.473 0.5 0 1
RISK 293 5.179 2.78 0 10
MALE 294 0.631 0.483 0 1
AGE 294 34.771 19.06 18 323
INCOME 293 4.275 2.813 1 10
EDUC 294 4.756 1.728 1 7
FAVORITE 294 11.372 4.713 1 20
LEAST FAV. 294 7.318 8.514 1 20
RISKIEST 294 8.411 4.599 1 20
SAFEST 294 13.661 4.233 1 20
PICKED FAV. 294 0.723 0.448 0 1
The data are generally high quality as the software ensures fields are not left empty.10
Unfortunately, there are a few accidental submissions, which we omit. Further evidence
of the data quality can be seen in subjects’ responses to the unincentivized expected value
questions. Overall, 61 percent of subjects correctly calculate the more precise expected value
question (question 6 in the instructions contained in the online Appendix).
9Roughly 90% of subjects are American and almost all of the remaining are Indian.
10There is some user error, as can be seen in Table 2, one subject broke the world record of human lifespan
(Weon and Je, 2009).
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Table 3: Distribution of Characteristics across Treatments
AGE MALE INCOME EDUC RISK AMB
TWO|RI -6.727 0.149 -0.258 0.344 0.986* 0.098
(4.211) (0.103) (0.591) (0.358) (0.58) (0.103)
TWO|RA -7.315* 0.028 -0.708 -0.421 -0.095 0.088
(4.349) (0.106) (0.611) (0.37) (0.599) (0.106)
FOUR|RI -7.946* 0.234** -0.339 0.043 0.904 -0.077
(4.237) (0.103) (0.599) (0.36) (0.587) (0.103)
FOUR|RA -8.762** 0.121 -0.554 -0.492 -0.314 -0.084
(4.38) (0.107) (0.615) (0.372) (0.603) (0.107)
SIX|RI -6.294 0.048 -0.53 0.787** 0.562 -0.054
(4.237) (0.103) (0.595) (0.36) (0.583) (0.103)
SIX|RA -8.741** 0.14 -0.129 -0.003 0.513 0.325***
(4.319) (0.105) (0.607) (0.367) (0.594) (0.105)
CONSTANT 41.341*** 0.511*** 4.554*** 4.703*** 4.788*** 0.426***
(2.929) (0.072) (0.411) (0.249) (0.403) (0.072)
Obs. 294 294 293 294 293 294
R2 0.0211 0.0045 0.007 0.0535 0.0283 0.0695
F-Test 0.4042 0.2944 0.9171 0.0144 0.2182 0.0020
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, and *: p < .10. Treat-
ment names abbreviated for space. RI - Rival, RA - Random. CONSTANT corresponds
to the ONE treatment.
The average values of demographic variables and individual characteristics are approx-
imately equal across treatments. In Table 3, we regress AGE, MALE, INCOME, EDUC-
TION, RISK, and AMB against the treatments to check for differences in subject char-
acteristics across treatments. As expected, there are few substantive differences as the
values of demographic variables are roughly evenly distributed across treatment groups.
However, FOUR|RIVAL has more male subjects; SIX|RIVAL has more educated subjects;
SIX|RANDOM has a higher percentage of ambiguity averse subjects; ONE has older sub-
jects; TWO|RIVAL has subjects more prepared to take risks.
With the observable characteristics split relatively evenly across the treatments, we take
differences in outcomes to be a result of the different treatments. In regards to outcomes,
subjects generally indicate that their favorite lottery is the safer lottery of the two that
maximize the expected payoff – lottery 11. Subjects generally regard the riskiest (lottery 1)
or the safest (lottery 20) lotteries as the worst. This results in an average worst lottery of
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7.3.
6.2 Behavioral Consistency Results
Regardless of the number of choices subjects have or the way they are paid (i.e., RANDOM
or RIVAL), l1∗ should remain the same for a given strategy whether or not subjects follow
EU or EU-I. At the same time, subjects should regard the worst lottery as the one furthest
from l1∗. As l1∗ is independent of the treatments, it also implies that the worst lottery should
be as well - as logically it is the one furthest from l1∗. If subjects select the lottery that
maximizes their expected value (e.g, lottery 10 or 11) as l1∗, it follows that the worst lottery
is lottery 1 or 20.
Actual subjects’ decisions are consistent with this logic. Figure 4 presents the lotteries
that subjects identify as their favorite and least favorite. As predicted, subjects have a
strong preference for the lotteries with the highest expected values and have little regard for
the lotteries offering rather low expected values. More detailed analysis regarding subjects’
favorite and least favorite lotteries is provided in the online appendix (Section A.2).11
7 Experimental Results
We now analyze treatment effects. Unless stated otherwise, all reported p-values are derived
from t-tests. Recall that lottery 1 is the riskiest and lottery 20 is the safest. Table 4
displays average outcomes across the primary treatments. All statistics are in terms of index
numbers on the lottery, except PICKED FAV. (which is equal to 1 if the subject picked
her favorite lottery). AVERAGE is the average index number of selected lotteries, which
11In the Online Appendix we also examine the likelihood of selecting the stated favorite lottery. In
general, subjects’ favorite lottery is more likely to be chosen when subjects have four or six choices, with
most of the coefficients being statistically significant. Surprisingly, some of the estimated coefficients for two
choices are negative, though not statistically significant. The only demographic variable which is statistically
significant is male, which is estimated to considerably reduce the likelihood of picking one’s favorite lottery.
Unconditional on treatment, subjects select their identified favorite lottery 72 percent of the time and are
more likely to select their favorite lottery when given additional choices.
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Figure 4: Favorite and Least Favorite Lotteries by Treatment
Note: Left Panels are the Favorite Lottery, Right Panels are the Least Favorite Lottery.
for all treatments is between 10.4 and 12.1. SAFEST is the maximum index number in the
portfolio, which is smallest for ONE and increases with the number of choices. RISKIEST
is the minimum index number, which decreases with the number of choices for both RIVAL
and RANDOM treatments. FAVORITE is the index value of the lottery identified as ‘the
best’ by subjects. For all treatments, the average favorite lottery was between 10 and 12
and suggests subjects are rather risk neutral. Similarly, LEAST FAV. is the index value
associated with the lottery identified as ‘the worst’.
7.1 Lottery Selections
Recall from Section 3 that subjects following Expected Utility (EU) will select lotteries that
are riskier than l1∗. If the population is predominantly made of subjects using an EU, one
should observe subjects picking 5, 3, or 1 riskier lotteries/lottery than l1∗. Alternatively,
EU-I types will evenly distribute their additional picks between lotteries that are riskier and
21
Table 4: Primary Treatment Effects
AVERAGE SAFEST RISKIEST FAVORITE LEAST PICKED
FAV. FAV.
ONE 10.936 10.936 10.936 11.66 6.000 0.638
(0.637) (0.637) (0.637) (0.679) (1.205) (0.071)
TWO|RIVAL 11.239 12.932 9.545 11.068 6.886 0.636
(0.449) (0.549) (0.543) (0.548) (1.303) (0.073)
TWO|RANDOM 10.615 12.256 8.974 11.308 7.564 0.487
(0.609) (0.631) (0.718) (0.841) (1.394) (0.081)
FOUR|RIVAL 11.401 14.86 7.953 11.744 7.116 0.837
(0.582) (0.597) (0.777) (0.863) (1.295) (0.057)
FOUR|RANDOM 11.875 14.132 9.605 11.816 6.789 0.737
(0.619) (0.639) (0.716) (0.731) (1.404) (0.072)
SIX|RIVAL 12.004 15.953 7.674 11.744 9.395 0.837
(0.515) (0.518) (0.625) (0.704) (1.363) (0.057)
SIX|RANDOM 10.492 14.425 5.900 10.050 9.200 0.900
(0.519) (0.597) (0.631) (0.663) (1.427) (0.048)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
safer than their favorite lottery.
Result 1 The number of choices has no affect on the average lottery selected within a port-
folio.
Hypothesis 1 suggests choice restriction will have no impact on the average lottery se-
lected. We fail to reject the null. The first column of Table 4, presents the average indicator
number of the selected lotteries, by treatment. First, note the average of the lotteries se-
lected is in the range of 10 to 12 for all treatments. Moreover, not one average is statistically
significantly different from any other. This is evidence in support of EU-I because as the
number of choices increases, subjects who are EU types will have a lower average choice.
This occurs because EU types would choose lotteries riskier than l1∗ as the number of choices
increases and this occurs regardless of their risk preferences. Conversely, EU-I subjects will
have selections centered around a particular lottery and expand out in both directions -
leaving the mean unchanged across the treatments.
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OLS results (Table 5) generally confirm the preceding discussion while also demonstrating
that the average lottery selected is negatively correlated to subjects’ willingness to take risks.
However, after controlling for traits and demographics, subjects in SIX|RIVAL tend to have
a safer average bundle than subjects in ONE. Though this effect is only significant at the 10
% level and in the opposite direction one would expect if subjects are using EU.
Table 5: Average Lottery Selected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TWO|RIVAL 0.302 0.551 0.553 0.621
(0.769) (0.759) (0.767) (0.783)
TWO|RAND -0.321 -0.369 -0.355 -0.13
(0.794) (0.779) (0.789) (0.803)
FOUR|RIVAL 0.465 0.838 0.755 0.808
(0.774) (0.767) (0.778) (0.783)
FOUR|RAND 0.939 0.873 0.804 0.885
(0.8) (0.785) (0.797) (0.809)
SIX|RIVAL 1.068 1.237 1.344* 1.426*
(0.774) (0.76) (0.772) (0.782)
SIX|RAND -0.445 -0.386 -0.404 -0.506
(0.789) (0.787) (0.796) (0.802)
AMB - 0.257 0.176 0.026
- (0.436) (0.444) (0.451)
RISK - -0.277*** -0.287*** -0.314***
- (0.077) (0.078) (0.08)
MALE - - 0.58 0.638
- - (0.449) (0.457)
INCOME - - 0.068 -
- - (0.077) -
EDUC - - -0.102 -
- - (0.126) -
AGE - - 0.003 0.001
- - (0.011) (0.011)
CONSTANT 10.936*** 12.153*** 11.998*** 5.53†
(0.535) (0.669) (1.036) (3.745)
Adj. R2 0.0007 0.0395 0.0349 0.0382
Obs. 294 293 293 293
Cat. Dum. NO NO NO YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05,
and *: p < .10. Cat. Dum. are categorical dummies for income and
education.
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Subjects in SIX|RIVAL on average pick 2.74 (±.586) lotteries safer than their subjectively
judged Best lottery and 2.42 (±.567 lotteries that are riskier than their favorite). Second,
their counterparts in FOUR|RIVAL behave similarly and on average pick 1.53 (±.421) lot-
teries safer than their favorite and 1.84 (±.435) lotteries that are riskier than their favorite.
Subjects in TWO|RIVAL on average pick .88 (±.22) lotteries that are safer than their favorite
and .55 (±.22) lotteries riskier than their favorite. Thus subjects are roughly distributing
their choices evenly across lotteries that are riskier and safer than their favorite - evidence
against EU.12
Result 2 Subjects with more choices select riskier “risky” lotteries, and subjects with more
choices select safer “safe” lotteries.
We find evidence to reject Hypotheses 2. In Table 6 we estimate subjects’ riskiest and
safest lottery selected, conditional on individual characteristics and treatments. Regardless
of the specification, increasing the number of choices, induces subjects to select riskier risky
lotteries and safer safe lotteries. The first part of Result 2 is consistent with EU maximizing
behavior and EU-I behavior; however, only the second part is inconsistent with EU maxi-
mization. Result 2 suggests (again) that subjects are behaving in a manner that is consistent
with an EU-I strategy.13 This observation coupled with the lack of significant differences in
the average lottery selected across treatments is particularly strong evidence against subjects
making choices consistent with EU.
7.2 Risk Aversion
In Table 6 it is easy to see that risk aversion is correlated with what subjects pick as their
riskiest lottery. Comparatively risk-loving subjects pick considerably riskier risky lotteries.
Additionally, risk aversion is also negatively related to subject’s average lottery selection
12We find further evidence consistent with subjects using an EU-I strategy by analyzing the frequency
and distribution of the selected lotteries across treatments. These figures are found in the Online Appendix
(Figure O.1).
13As a robustness check, we allow subjects to repeat selections, see Section 7.4 for details.
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(Table 5). After controlling for the treatment, a 1 Likert unit increase in subjects willingness
to take risks is associated with a .28 decrease in the average lottery selected (p < 0.001).
Result 3 Subjects who indicate that they are more prepared to take risks have relatively
riskier “safe” picks and riskier “risky” picks.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that stated (and unincentivized) individual risk preferences will
have no affect on lottery selection. We find strong evidence against this null. Recall that
after subjects select their lotteries, we ask about their risk preferences. As one would expect,
individual risk preferences have a close relationship with subjects’ lottery selection. Visually,
this can be seen in the graphs shown in Figure 5, which presents subjects’ choices in each
treatment, sorted as stated from most risk averse to most risk loving. Each column represents
a subject and each row represents a lottery. A large square within a lottery square is a
subject’s choice and smaller square indicates the subject’s favorite lottery. “X” indicates the
subject selected what they indicated as the best lottery. As can be seen in these figures,
subjects often pick a series of lotteries, with their favorite lottery being somewhat in the
middle of their k selections. These figures when combined with Table O.4 in the Appendix
(which shows the percentage of subjects who selected only adjacent lotteries - e.g., 5,6,7,
and 8) and results pertaining to riskiest and safest lottery selections are strong evidence in
support of EU-I.
7.3 Reference Dependent Utility
Rather than following EU-I, subjects may be selecting lotteries using Reference Dependent
Utility (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992). In this case, subjects select lotteries using the
utility function specified in Equation 11. While somewhat cumbersome, this utility function
implies that the decision maker would first select a payoff that serves as her reference lottery
(w¯) and her utility is derived based upon the difference of the reference payoff and her ex-post
payoff. If the lottery she selects earns her a payoff greater than w¯, her utility is v(wi− w¯). If
26
Figure 5: Subjects’ Decisions Sorted by Risk Preferences
Notes: A large square within a lottery square is a subject’s choice and smaller square
indicates the subject’s favorite lottery. “X” indicates the subject selected what they
indicated as the best lottery. Rows correspond to treatments as follows: ONE,
TWO|RIVAL, FOUR|RIVAL, and SIX|RIVAL, respectably.
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her payoff is less than w¯, her utility is −λf(−(wi − w¯)) - where wi = 0 if no lottery is won.
U = max{v(wi − w¯)αIi(ψi ≤ pi∀i ∈ k)} if max{I1...Ik} 6= 0 & wi ≥ w¯
U = max{−λv(−(wi − w¯))αIi(ψi ≤ pi∀i ∈ k)} if max{I1...Ik} 6= 0 & wi < w¯
U = −λ(−w¯)α if max{I1...Ik} = 0
(11)
To test this possibility, we simulate subjects’ decisions while varying λ. As in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), we assume v(.) and f(.) are exponential in terms of α and β, respectably.
We further assume, that α = .88. In Figure 6, we present the results of the simulations.
With these parameters, regardless of the value of λ, the reference lottery/payoff is lottery 11
which rewards $2.50 with a probability of 55 percent. As can be seen in Figure 6, Reference
Dependent Utility preferences do a fair job predicting actual subject behavior but only at
extreme values of λ. That is, only when λ is in the neighborhood of 30 do we begin to observe
the pattern of behavior consistent with what we see in the experiment. The intuition for the
pattern of choices observed in the simulations of RDU is actually quite simple: back-loading
lotteries (i.e., adding safer but lower value lotteries) is costly. While these lotteries lower the
probability that the subject walks away with nothing, she would still suffer a cost due to the
prize of the lottery being less than her reference lottery.
While simulations using RDU can predict subject behavior, doing so requires questionable
parameter values.14 In contrast, we can get similar predictions with EU-I needing only
sensible values for risk aversion.
7.4 Diversification Bias and Choice
Arguably the strongest evidence against EU-I comes from the results of an additional
treatment (SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT) that serves primarily as robustness check of EU-I. In
SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT, subjects are given 6 choices but are allowed to select the same lottery
as many times as they wish while also being paid based upon the outcome that is ex-post
14Tversky and Kahneman (1992) considers values of λ such that the median was 2.25.
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most favorable to them. Theoretically if subjects are following EU-I, we would observe a
plurality of subjects picking the same lottery 6 times and this lottery would be the one they
report as their favorite. As can be seen in Figure O.2 (Appendix), we do not observe this.
Ex-post, we hypothesized that this behavior was due to a diversification bias. As a test of
our diversification hypothesis, we run an additional experiment (SIX|RANDOM-REPEAT).
This treatment has the same setup as (SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT) except subjects are paid based
upon the outcome of a lottery selected at random. Thus there is clear incentive to repeatedly
select the lottery with highest expected value. If subjects’ decisions in SIX|RANDOM-
REPEAT are similar to those observed in SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT it suggests that the lack of
picking the same lottery in SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT is due to diversification bias.
Subjects’ decisions in SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT and SIX|RANDOM-REPEAT (i.e., the lot-
teries they selected) sorted by risk preferences are found in Figures O.2 and O.3 in the
Online Appendix. As can be seen in Figures O.2 and O.3, visually the lottery selections in
SIX|RANDOM-REPEAT and SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT are quite similar. While there is a slight
increase in the number of subjects picking the same lottery in SIX|RANDOM-REPEAT com-
pared to SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT, this difference is not significant (14% vs. 22%; p = 0.369).
Other summary statistics of subject decisions are found in Table 7. The bottom row
in Table 7 reports p-values resulting from a set of T-tests testing for differences across
SIX|RANDOM-REPEAT and SIX|RIVAL-REPEAT treatments. As can be seen the only
significant difference to report is a marginally significant difference in the riskiest lottery
selected. These findings suggest that lack of picking the same lottery 6 times in SIX|RIVAL-
REPEAT is partially due to a diversification bias.
7.5 Improving Bundle Selection with Experience
We now explore how bundle selection changes with experience to test whether the observed
behavior is due to lack of experience. These treatments are replications of the FOUR|RIVAL
treatment but with the addition of practice. We denote these treatments as “FOUR|P”
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Table 7: Subject Decisions in Repeat Treatments
Average Safest Riskiest Favorite Worst Pick Fav. n
SIX|RIVAL- 10.54 14.048 6.405 11.524 5.786 0.714 42
REPEAT (0.556) (0.736) (0.712) (10.833) (1.127) (0.071)
SIX|RANDOM- 11.023 13.611 8.222 10.833 8.361 0.75 36
REPEAT (0.589) (0.576) (0.827) (0.931) (1.497) (0.073)
p− value 0.553 0.65 0.098 0.569 0.167 0.727
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses.
hereafter. In each of these treatments, we give subjects 4 choices. Subjects make 3 practice
bundle selections prior to making their final bundle selection. After each practice selection,
we show subjects the expected value of the bundle and the lotteries within the bundle they
selected. This information is displayed during each subsequent period.15 After making
their final lottery selections, subjects in FOUR|P indicate their favorite and least favorite
lottery and end the session with the same set of survey questions as subjects in the previous
treatments.
Across the practice treatments, we vary the amount and type of information that subjects
receive. In the simplest setting, subjects are only presented with the expected value of
their bundle, we denote this FOUR|P. A second treatment displays the simple lottery which
their bundle reduces to. That is, subjects are told the likelihood of receiving each of the
four prizes. We denote this treatment as FOUR|P+ SIMPLE. In addition to receiving
this information, before making any selections, subjects in FOUR|P+SIMPLE are given
a layperson’s explanation of proposition 1. For this reason, we might expect differences
in initial selections in this treatment and those in FOUR|P. Finally, in a third treatment,
we explicitly tell subjects which bundle maximizes the expected value after they complete
their practice rounds, but before they make their final selection. We call this treatment
FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST.
To evaluate the effect of these treatments, we will see whether the new pre-selection in-
15This design was chosen as we want subjects to be able to observe how the expected value of their bundles
change with changes in their lottery selections. Moreover, by allowing subjects to see all of their practice
decisions, we avoid problems associated with differential memories across subjects.
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formation influences initial choices. We do this by comparing the initial choices made in the
practice treatments to choices in the FOUR|RIVAL treatment. These comparisons can be
found in Table 8. Table 8 presents OLS results to identify significant differences between the
practice treatments and FOUR|RIVAL, as well as differences across the three practice treat-
ments. The only statistically significant difference is that subjects in FOUR|P+SIMPLE
initially choose riskier safe lotteries than subjects in FOUR|RIVAL. While this might be ex-
pected, given the additional information received in this treatment, it is surprising that those
in FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST did not also select a riskier safe choice as they received the
same information. In comparing across practice treatments, the only statistically significant
difference is that individuals in FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST and FOUR|P+SIMPLE choose
riskier risky lotteries than those in FOUR|P. As subjects in FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST and
FOUR|P+SIMPLE receive the same information prior to participating in the practice stage,
it is not surprising that their risky selections are similar. However, we do not want to
oversell differences in the initial bundle selections in the FOUR|P sessions because there
is only a single significant difference from FOUR|RIVAL. In sum, the differences in initial
selections are probably modest at best and thus suggest that providing a more detailed
description of the task and payoffs has little impact on subjects’ bundle selections. Note
this finding is consistent with what we observe in the treatment where subjects are not told
the expected value of each lottery and select 4 lotteries (FOUR|RIVAL - NO EV). Bundle
selection in FOUR|RIVAL - NO EV is not statistically different than the behavior observed
in FOUR|RIVAL.16
We now examine how the new information and experience with these types of decisions
influences choices by subject. This is done using (subject) fixed effects regressions. The
results of these regressions are presented in Table 9. The regressions compare selections in
practice rounds 2, 3, and final selections to the initial selection made by the subject. Within
the practice only regressions (FOUR|P in Table 9), we find subjects choose both riskier risky
16Discussed in detail in the appendix.
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Table 8: Initial Selections in Practice Treatments VS. FOUR|RIVAL
Start EV Average Risky Safe n
FOUR|Pa 0.049 -0.02 0.897 -0.86 40
(0.115) (0.799) (1.012) (0.857)
FOUR|P+SIMPLEb 0.169 -1.244 -1.084 -1.687** 46
(0.111) (0.771) (0.977) (0.827)
FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BESTc 0.157 -0.895 -0.807 -0.86 41
(0.114) (0.793) (1.006) (0.851)
CONSTANT 2.274*** 11.401*** 7.953*** 14.86*** 43
(0.08) (0.554) (0.703) (0.595)
Obs 170 170 170 170
R2 0.0191 0.0228 0.0276 0.0244
a=b 0.289 0.121 0.048 0.329
a=c 0.356 0.280 0.098 1.000
b=c 0.911 0.656 0.780 0.325
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***: p <.01, **: p <.05, and *: p <.10. p-values
for F-test of equality of treatment dummies reported.
picks and safe picks in period 2 and in the final round but not in period 3. Moreover, the
coefficients for period 2 and the final selections are quite similar, suggesting that subjects
choose quite similarly in period 2 and the final round. The coefficients for period 3 are about
half the size of period 2, suggesting that subjects picked slightly less risky riskiest and safest
choices in this period. Therefore, subjects seem to benefit from experience due to learning
which is also reflected in the expected values of their final bundle selections.17
Examining the choices in FOUR|P+SIMPLE and FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST reveals that
little changes across most of the practice rounds - which is quite different from FOUR|P.
However, this is expected. In both of these treatments subjects are informed of how the rival
nature of payoffs affects the contribution of risky and safe lotteries to the expected value
of their portfolio of lotteries. Within FOUR|P+SIMPLE subjects choose riskier safe picks
compared to their initial selections but only in Period 2. Moreover, their final selections
were not statistically different from their initial selections.18 This is quite different from final
17Results available upon request.
18In results not shown expected values do not change.
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practice treatment. Recall that in FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST subjects are informed of the
expected value maximizing bundle of lotteries prior to making their final selection. Therefore
we are not surprised that only in this treatment are the final selections are statistically dif-
ferent than the initial selections, with subjects choosing both risker risky and safe selections.
This finding is interesting, as it suggests that subjects were likely trying to maximize their
expected winnings, but were not able to do so even with the knowledge of the expected value
and the simple lottery a chosen bundle collapses to. This suggests, somewhat unsurprisingly,
that optimizing with rival outcomes is non-trivial.
Table 9: The Effect of Practice on Subjects’ Decisions
FOUR|P FOUR|P+SIMPLE FOUR|P+SIMPLE
+BEST
Riskiest Safest Riskiest Safest Riskiest Safest
Period 2 -1.775*** -2.2*** -0.804 -1.522** 0.659 -0.512
0.587 0.491 0.51 0.629 0.441 0.485
Period 3 -0.875 -1.075** -0.435 0.043 -0.244 -0.78
0.587 0.491 0.51 0.629 0.441 0.485
Final -1.8*** -2.325*** -0.565 -0.5 -1.244*** -2.244***
0.587 0.491 0.51 0.629 0.441 0.485
Constant 8.85*** 14*** 6.87*** 13.174*** 7.146*** 14***
0.415 0.347 0.361 0.445 0.312 0.343
ρ 0.582 0.691 0.702 0.431 0.753 0.669
R2 0.099 0.201 0.019 0.056 0.138 0.164
Notes: Fixed Effects Panel Regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. ***:
p <.01, **: p <.05, and * :p <.10. 41-46 groups and 4 observations per group.
We now analyze whether the practice treatments influenced final selections relative to the
choices made in FOUR|RIVAL. Table 10 compares several outcomes across the three practice
treatments to one another and to FOUR|RIVAL using OLS. All of the practice treatments
resulted in increased expected values relative to FOUR|RIVAL. Moreover, the expected
value for FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST was highest of all, being $0.417 higher on average,
compared to a mean of $2.274 in FOUR|RIVAL, an increase of 18.33%. The difference
between FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST and the other practice treatments are also marginally
statistically significant. Thus demonstrating that informing subjects of the expected value
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maximizing bundle increased the expected value of their bundle. No other differences between
practice treatments are statistically significant.
Picking the optimal bundle not only requires the decision maker to get the spread between
their risky and safe selections correct, but also requires them to pick the correct lotteries
within that range. If their bundle is too balanced, the decision maker will end up leaving
money on the table. It seems therefore that the explanatory power of EU-I is due to its
use as a heuristic rather than a preference for a more balanced portfolio. We explore this
possibility in the next section.
Table 10: Final Selections in Practice VS. FOUR|RIVAL
EV Average Risky Safe
FOUR|Pa 0.224** -1.914** -0.903 -3.185*** 40
(0.101) (0.743) (0.894) (0.807)
FOUR|P+SIMPLEb 0.258*** -1.792** -1.649* -2.187*** 46
(0.098) (0.717) (0.863) (0.779)
FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BESTc 0.417*** -2.621*** -2.051** -3.104*** 41
(0.101) (0.738) (0.888) (0.801)
CONSTANT 2.274*** 11.401*** 7.953*** 14.86*** 43
(0.07) (0.515) (0.621) (0.56)
Obs 170 170 170 170
R2 0.0955 0.077 0.0365 0.1107
a=b 0.741 0.869 0.398 0.210
a=c 0.063 0.348 0.206 0.921
b=c 0.110 0.256 0.646 0.246
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***:p <.01, **:p <.05, and *:p <.10. p-values for
F-test of equality of treatment dummies reported.
8 Preference or Heuristic?
We have seen that individuals often make decisions that are more closely aligned with max-
imizing expected utility as if payoffs are independent, while occasionally exhibiting a pref-
erence for diversification. We now consider whether the observed deviations from expected
utility maximization are a result of a preference or a heuristic. When we say subjects may
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have a preference for an EU−I type bundle, we mean that even with full information, sub-
jects wish to select a bundle made up of lotteries that would maximize expected utility as
if the payoffs were independent. In other words, they want a bundle made up of their k
favorite lotteries. Alternatively, the observed behavior that is consistent with EU−I may be
due to a heuristic that is used to simplify a complicated expected value calculation. If sub-
jects are using a heuristic, we should observe a disproportionate fraction of subjects selecting
the expected value maximizing bundle when they are informed of which bundle maximizes
expected value, when the actual calculation is difficult.19 On the other hand, if subjects’
choices are representative of a preference, the fraction of subjects selecting the expected value
maximizing bundle should not change when they are given the expected value maximizing
bundle, when the calculation is difficult.
We presume that the calculations become more difficult as the number of choices increase
and/or when the payoffs are rival. Therefore, with only one choice the problem is trivial, as
subjects are given the expected value of each lottery. With two choices we expect that bundle
selection with rival payoffs is more complicated than with random as random only requires
maximizing a sum of stated values. Similarly, we expect RIVAL decisions to be more difficult
than RANDOM decisions for four and six. The only other treatment where identifying the
expected value maximizing bundle is trivial is FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST. This is because
subjects in this treatment are explicitly given the expected value maximizing bundle. If we
assume that the fraction of risk neutral individuals is constant across treatments, than we
should expect to see similar fractions of individuals choosing the maximal expected value
bundle in FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST and ONE, if preferences are all that matter.
Table 11 calculates the fraction of individuals in each treatment that choose the expected
value maximizing bundle, and tests whether that fraction is different from the ONE treat-
ment. The fractions are highest in ONE, FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST, and the RANDOM
19However, the shift should be imperfect because the choices made will be a function of individuals’ risk
preferences. So, if subjects are given the expected value maximizing bundle, we should only expect subjects
who are risk neutral to select this bundle.
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Table 11: Share Selecting Maximal Bundle by Treatment
ONE 2|RI 2|RA 4|RI 4|RA 6|RI 6|RA 4|P 4|P+S 4|P+S+B
share best 46.8% 0.0% 20.5% 2.3% 21.1% 0.0% 18.4% 0.0% 0.0% 34.1%
Diff v. ONE - 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.23
Notes: Treatment names abbreviated for space. 2-TWO, 4-FOUR, and 6-SIX. RI-RIVAL and RA-
RANDOM. P-PRACTICE, S-SIMPLE, and B-BEST
choices for FOUR and SIX while near zero elsewhere. This is consistent with our assumption
that RIVAL calculations are more difficult. Indeed, the only treatment which does not have
statistically significant different fraction of subjects selecting the expected value maximizing
bundle from ONE is FOUR|P+SIMPLE+BEST. This is exactly what one would expect if
subjects are using a heuristic to make their decisions despite a desire to maximize expected
utility.
One might expect all subjects to pick the expected value maximizing bundle, this bundle
only maximizes expected utility for risk neutral individuals. While there is significant varia-
tion in stated risk preferences, stated risk preferences are fairly consistent across treatments.
In analysis not shown, the only treatment with a statistically significantly different level of
stated risk preferences was TWO|RIVAL.20 Given that the average stated risk preference
was slightly above 5 (corresponding to right between “risk averse” and “fully prepared to
take risks”) and that the average lottery selected in ONE was 10.96 (the expected value
maximizing lottery), we are fairly confident that a plurality of subjects are risk neutral and
these subjects picked the expected value maximizing bundle when identifying that bundle
was trivial. Deviations from this bundle were therefore likely due to the fact that the ex-
pected value maximizing bundle does not maximize expected utility if the subject is not
risk neutral. This suggests that the deviation from EU in rival treatments is due to the
complicated nature of calculations rather than a preference for a bundle that is made up of
lotteries with the highest expected values.
20Subjects in TWO|RIVAL indicated a slightly lower level of risk aversion than subjects in other treat-
ments.
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9 Conclusion
Having discussed how subjects behave in a manner inconsistent with multiple theories, and
how choice restriction results in fewer risks being taken, we now discuss the relevance of these
findings for the college application decision. Attending and completing college generally
leads to increased lifetime earnings while also providing an opportunity for upward social
mobility. However, low income individuals are less likely to apply for college and if they
do, they generally apply to less selective schools. Additionally, low income students apply
to fewer schools than their high income counterparts. This results in low income students
attending less selective schools and reduces the aggregate returns to higher education for low
income students.
Our experiment is consistent with findings in Pallais (2015). When our subjects receive
more choices, they are more likely to choose both riskier and safer lotteries. This behavior is
inconsistent with expected utility theory. In a setting we refer to as “risky rival outcomes”
subjects appear to make decisions based on expected utility with independent outcomes
rather than expected utility theory. This is an important distinction as previous theoretical
and empirical work assumes application portfolio selection is done by maximizing expected
utility. For instance, Fu (2014) models the portfolio decision in a large structural model
assuming students select their application portfolio by solving an expected utility maximiza-
tion problem.21 Our experiments show that the assumption of expected utility maximization
may result in too few predicted applications to safer schools.
One policy implication would be to provide low income individuals subsides for college
applications. Encouragingly, in the 2014-2015 academic year the College Board enacted
such a policy. In it certain low income students are able to both write the SAT for free,
and receive vouchers for up to four free college applications, at participating colleges.22 The
21The application decision is part of a larger model determining tuition, applications, admission, and
enrollment. The application decision is essentially one of whether to apply to certain categories of schools:
public vs. private, elite vs. non-elite, in-state vs. out-of-state, and the interactions of those.
22See https://bigfuture.collegeboard.org/get-in/applying-101/college-application-fee-waivers
and https://sat.collegeboard.org/register/sat-fee-waivers for details.
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analysis from our experiment suggests that this policy may greatly improve the welfare of
low income students - particularly those with high ability.
Finally, our findings may help to explain why interventionist policies that use expert
advice, like the one discussed by Carrell and Sacerdote (2013) are so effective. We show that
individuals do not take into account the rival nature of the lotteries and instead pick lotteries
as if they are independent. Additionally, when informed of the maximal bundle subjects
were more likely to choose it. It stands to reason that in other scenarios with rival uncertain
outcomes, like the college application process, people do not maximize their expected utility
and instead use a heuristic that simplifies the calculations but decreases the expected value.
We find the use of a heuristic in the real life decision making especially likely because during
(for example) the college application process, students are not given exact probabilities of
admission nor precise expected lifetime earnings gained from attending a given university.
Thus, it seems unlikely students will take into account the extremal gains from applying to
more selective universities. Unlike most real life decisions, in our experiment, subjects are
given the expected values, provided a detailed description of the benefits of selecting riskier
choices and, yet, some agents only select the maximal bundle after subjects are explicitly
told what bundle maximizes expected value.
In the case of the college application process, this is unfortunate because it translates into
students applying to additional less selective schools. Essentially, we believe that policies
using expert advice correct this heuristic. While the expert advice often also advises stu-
dents to choose safety schools, which are not predicted under EU, Hoxby and Avery (2013)
shows that expert advice also leads to students applying to more selective universities which
increases their likelihood of attending more selective schools.
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Figure 6: RDU Maximizing Choices under Various Risk Preferences
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A Appendix
A.1 Variable Descriptions
• AMB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject was classified as ambiguity averse.
• RISK self reported risk preference. 0 if risk averse; 10 if full prepared to take risks.
• MALE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the subject indicates they are male; equal
0 otherwise.
• AGE is the subject’s reported age.
• INCOME is the subject’s reported income. This variable is categorical, increasing in
intervals of $12,500 and can take a value from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating an income less
than $12,500 and 10 being greater than $ 100,000. All figures in US dollars.
• EDUC is the subject’s level of education. This variable is categorical, increasing in
educational achievement.
• BEST is the lottery that the subject specifies as the best.
• WORST is the lottery that the subject specifies as the worst.
• RISKIEST is the subject’s riskiest choice.
• SAFEST is the subject’s safest choice.
• PICKED FAV. is a dummy variable equal to one if the subject picked what they
thought of as the best lottery.
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A.2 Ellesberg Details
We use the Ellesberg paradox to classify subjects as ambiguity averse, or not. Below, are
the questions we use for ambiguity aversion classification. We classify a subject as ambiguity
averse if they indicate that they prefer choice(a) in question 1 and choice (d)in question 2.
1) Suppose there is a bag containing 90 balls. You know that 30 are red and the other 60
are a mix of black and yellow in unknown proportion. One ball is to be drawn from
the bag at random. You are offered a choice to (a) win $ 100 if the ball is red and
nothing if otherwise, or (b) win $100 if it’s black and nothing if otherwise. Which do
you prefer?
2) The bag is refilled as before, and a second ball is to drawn from the bag at random. You
are offered a choice to (c) win $ 100 if the ball is red or yellow, or (d) win $ 100 if the
ball is black or yellow. Which do you prefer?
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For Online Publication
Distribution of Choices
The left side of the Figures in O.1 are the probability distribution function of choices by the
choice treatments. The right side of these figures are histograms of subjects’ actual choices.
As expected, the mass is mostly centered on the favorite choices.
Figure O.1: Distribution of Choices and Choice Counts by Treatment
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Expected Value
Result 4 Holding the number of choices fixed, there are few differences in the chosen bundles
across random and rival sessions.
If subjects do not maximize their expected utility it would suggest there to be no sig-
nificant differences between random and rival sessions assuming an equal number of choices
in terms of the choice bundle’s expected utility. A failure to reject this proposition would
suggest subjects are not maximizing expected utility in rival sessions but are rather using
EU-I. This is precisely what we observe. Clearly, while expected utility increases with the
given number of choices, there are few significant differences across rival and random ses-
sions. This is most clearly seen in Table O.1 which estimates the expected value of subject
i’s bundle, conditional on the treatment and demographic characteristics.23
Below each regression in Table O.1 we present p-values from a set of f-tests testing if
coefficient estimates of X|RIVAL = X|RANDOM for X = 2, 4, 6. We find little in the way of
differences across RANDOM and RIVAL sessions. The only significant differences are found
when testing if SIX|RIVAL is equal to SIX|RANDOM. The test results suggest that the
bundles subjects’ selected in SIX|RANDOM have a higher expected value than the selected
bundles in SIX|RIVAL. This is somewhat surprising and particularly strong evidence that
subjects are not maximizing their expected utility. If subject maximized expected utility,
then the expected value in rival sessions would be greater than the expected value in random
sessions.
23Although we only present regression results with the dependent variable calculated using rival expected
value, the results are stronger with the dependent variable calculated using random lottery selection expected
value - which is consistent with our general result.
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Table O.1: Expected Value of Selected Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TWO|RIVAL 0.654*** 0.619*** 0.618*** 0.645***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.106)
TWO|RANDOM 0.603*** 0.604*** 0.627*** 0.627***
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109)
FOUR|RIVAL 1.132*** 1.094*** 1.092*** 1.103***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106)
FOUR|RANDOM 1.11*** 1.122*** 1.137*** 1.164***
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.11)
SIX|RIVAL 1.443*** 1.426*** 1.424*** 1.452***
(0.104) (0.103) (0.105) (0.106)
SIX|RANDOM 1.638*** 1.612*** 1.623*** 1.649***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109)
AMB - 0.027 0.01 0.03
- (0.059) (0.06) (0.061)
RISK - 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032***
- (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
MALE - - 0.084 0.061
- - (0.061) (0.062)
INCOME - - 0.008 -
- - (0.01) -
EDUC - - 0.016 -
- - (0.017) -
AGE - - 0.002 0.002
- - (0.001) (0.001)
CONSTANT 1.143*** 0.974*** 0.768*** 1.408***
(0.072) (0.091) (0.14) (0.509)
Obs. 293 293 293 293
R2 0.5396 0.5553 0.5623 0.5788
2ri = 2ra 0.6412 0.8898 0.9308 0.9308
4ri = 4ra 0.8418 0.7980 0.6836 0.6836
6ri = 6ra 0.0738 0.0897 0.0732 0.0732
Cat. Dum. NO NO NO YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***: p < .01, **: p < .05, and *:
p < .10. Cat. Dum. are categorical dummies for income and education.
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Table O.2: Best and Worst Lottery by Treatment
Best Lottery Worst Lottery
TWO|RIVAL -0.707 -0.521 3.234 3.061
(1.145) (1.143) (13.602) (13.425)
TWO|RANDOM -0.285 -0.37 9.635 11.038
(1.188) (1.18) (13.86) (13.692)
FOUR|RIVAL 0.053 0.348 13.858 9.125
(1.159) (1.162) (13.427) (13.316)
FOUR|RANDOM 0.296 0.287 2.72 2.27
(1.196) (1.189) (14.135) (13.972)
SIX|RIVAL 0.255 0.427 26.691* 24.983*
(1.157) (1.151) (13.694) (13.457)
SIX|RANDOM -1.797 -1.864 22.051 25.83*
(1.176) (1.187) (13.896) (14.052)
AMB - 0.624 - -13.596*
- (0.658) - (7.779)
RISK - -0.241** - 1.793
- (0.117) - (1.363)
CONSTANT 11.73*** 12.612*** -20.072* -22.864*
(0.799) (1.012) (10.299) (12.719)
Obs. 294 293 294 293
R2 0.0027 0.0058 0.0088 0.0153
LL 20 20 168 168
UL 27 27 87 87
Notes: Tobit estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. ***:p <.01,
**:p <.05, and *:p <.10. Upper Limit (UL) and Lower Limit (LL) are
lotteries 1 and 20.
Favorite and Least Favorite by Demographic Characteristics and
Treatment
In Table O.2, we estimate subjects’ ex-post classification of the best and worst lotteries as a
function of the treatments and individual preferences using a Tobit specification. Individual
risk preferences significantly influence subjects perceptions of the best lottery, but not of the
worst lottery. Subjects who are relatively prepared to take risk, tend to favor a lottery that
is riskier than subjects who are less prepared to take risk. Similar results are found with
alternative models (i.e., ordered probit and multinomial logit).
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Probability of Selecting Favorite by Demographic Characteristics
and Treatment
Table O.3: Probability of Picking Best Lottery
(1) (2) (3)
TWO|RIVAL -0.006 0.001 0.023
(0.269) (0.272) (0.277)
TWO|RAND -0.387 -0.378 -0.419
(0.275) (0.276) (0.282)
FOUR|RIVAL 0.63** 0.602** 0.651**
(0.296) (0.299) (0.307)
FOUR|RAND 0.28 0.266 0.252
(0.288) (0.289) (0.294)
SIX|RIVAL 0.63** 0.618** 0.657**
(0.296) (0.297) (0.306)
SIX|RAND 0.928*** 0.97*** 0.977***
(0.329) (0.336) (0.341)
ABM - -0.126 -0.099
- (0.168) (0.172)
RISK - 0.004 0.015
- (0.03) (0.031)
MALE - - -0.367**
- - (0.179)
INCOME - - 0.012
- - (0.031)
EDUC - - -0.035
- - (0.05)
AGE - - -0.005
- - (0.005)
CONSTANT 0.354* 0.393 0.822**
(0.187) (0.249) (0.397)
Obs. 294 293 293
R2 0.0027 0.0781 0.095
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***:p <.01,
**:p <.05, and *:p <.10.
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Sequential Lotteries
Table O.4: Percentage Choosing Sequential Lotteries
TWO FOUR SIX ALL
RIVAL 0.5 0.488 0.535 0.508
(0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.044)
RANDOM 0.513 0.737 0.5 0.585
(0.081) (0.072) (0.08) (0.046)
ALL 0.506 0.605 0.518 0.544
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.032)
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses.
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SIX|RIVAL (Repeat) and SIX|RANDOM (Repeat) Decisions
Figure O.2: Subjects’ Decisions Sorted by Risk Preferences
Treatment: SIX|RIVAL (Repeat)
Notes: See notes from Figure 5.
Figure O.3: Subjects’ Decisions Sorted by Risk Preferences
Treatment: SIX|RANDOM (Repeat)
Notes: See notes from Figure 5.
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Removing Expected Value
To check if including the expected value of each lottery had an effect on subject behavior,
as a robustness check we run an additional treatment where we give subjects four choices
but do not reveal what the expected value of each lottery is. The results of the analysis can
be found in Table O.5. There are no significant differences between FOUR|RIVAL with or
without the expected value of each lottery begin given.
Table O.5: The Effect of Expected Value
Average Safest Riskiest Favorite Worst Pick Favorite n
FOUR|RIVAL 11.401 14.860 7.953 11.744 7.116 0.837 43
(0.582) (0.597) (0.777) (0.863) (1.295) (0.057)
FOUR|RIVAL−NO EV 11.269 14.45 7.425 11.8 6.243 0.725 40
(0.544) (0.546) (0.738) (0.758) (1.39) (0.072)
p− value 0.869 0.615 .624 0.962 0.647 0.220
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses.
Figure O.4: Subjects’ Decisions Sorted by Risk Preferences
Treatment: FOUR|RIVAL − NO EV
Notes: See notes from Figure 5.
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Experiment Instructions
Below are the general instructions of the HIT. There are minor changes depending on the
treatment, the exclusion of expected values, the ability to select the same lottery more
than once, and experience. The specific instructions relating to the robustness checks and
exploratory treatments are available upon request.
Introduction
Welcome to the HIT! The instructions for this HIT are straightforward. If you follow them
carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money in addition to your participation fee
of 25 cents. The additional amount you earn will be paid through the Amazon Mechanical
Turk Bonus. Your confidentiality is assured.
In this HIT, there are 20 lotteries that vary both by their jackpots (payouts) and their
odds (probability of winning). As such the expected value of the lotteries(probability of
wining times the payout) also vary. You will be asked to select your X favorite lotteries,
from the 20 available lotteries.
For each chosen lottery, a computer will randomly draw a number between zero and one
to determine whether you have won that lottery. If the number drawn is less than or equal
to the probability of the lottery winning, then you won that lottery.
For example, let us assume that lottery C has a probability of winning of 15 percent, then
any number drawn by the computer between 0.00 and 0.15 would win the lottery and any
number between 0.16 and 1.00 would not win the lottery. Your payment for this HIT will be
the maximum payment from any successful lottery. If you were to win only one lottery, than
the payout from that lottery would be your payment. If you were to win two lotteries, your
payment would be the highest value of the two payouts. If you do not win any lotteries, you
will only receive your participation fee.
Before you begin, we would like you to complete a brief survey to make sure that you
comprehend written English.
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Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
Survey
Before we begin please take a few minutes to complete this short survey. When you are
finished, please click the “next” button. Note there are two English comprehension questions.
If you fail to answer any of them correctly, you will be asked to return the HIT and will not
be able to continue. After you finish selecting your favorite lotteries, you will be instructed
to complete another short survey.
1. What is your gender?
2. What is your age?
3. What country do you currently live in?
4. Paul bought a baseball for X dollars. Jim bought a candybar for one dollar. How
much did Paul’s baseball cost?
5. You and your friend are playing a game with a coin. If the coin is flipped and ends
up heads you win a dollar. If it ends up tails you win nothing. What is the expected
value of this game (in CENTS)?
6. What is the expected value of a game that pays 200 dollars with probability 25 percent?
Please just enter as an integer number.
Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
Practice
For example, you are asked to select your favourite 3 lotteries from lotteries A, B, C, D and
E. The lotteries’ payoffs are as follows:
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Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C Lottery D Lottery E
Prob 10 % 20% 50% 60% 80%
Prize $4.50 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $1.00
EV $0.45 $0.80 $1.50 $1.20 $0.80
From the table above you can see that Lottery A pays 4.50 with a probability of 10%,
Lottery B pays 4.00 with a probability of 20%, Lottery C pays 3.00 with a probability of 50%,
Lottery D pays 2.00 with a probability of 60% and Lottery E pays 1.00 with a probability
of 80%.
You select lotteries A, C, and E. The outcomes of each of these lotteries are as follows:
1. Lottery A draws the number .2, which is greater than .1 and therefore unfavorable to
you.
2. Lottery C draws the number .1, which is less than .5 and therefore favorable to you.
3. Lottery E draws the number .8, which is equal to .8 and therefore favorable to you.
Your earnings for the lottery part of the HIT would therefore be 3.00 dollars. This is
because the outcome of lottery A was unfavorable to you. While both lotteries C and E were
favorable to you, the favorable outcome of Lottery C ($3.00) is greater than the favorable
outcome of Lottery E ($1.00).
Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C Lottery D Lottery E
Prob 10 % 20% 50% 60% 80%
Prize $4.50 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $1.00
EV $0.45 $0.80 $1.50 $1.20 $0.80
When you are asked to make your actual decisions, you will see a chart like the one shown
on the practice stage but there will be more lotteries and there will be a box underneath
each lottery. In each of these boxes, there will be two radio buttons. One radio button
will correspond to “No” while the other will correspond to “Yes”. The “No” button will be
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indicated with a “N” while the “Yes” button will be indicated with a “Y”. You will use these
radio buttons to indicate your preferred lotteries.
If a given lottery is among your X preferred lotteries, click the corresponding “Yes” radio
button. If not, click the “No” radio button.
After you have indicated your X preferred lotteries, you will be asked to click the “next”
button to complete the final parts of the HIT.
Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
Game
Please indicate your X favorite lotteries. After you have indicated your X preferred lotteries,
click the “next” button to finish up the final parts of the HIT.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T
Prob 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%
Prize $5.00 $4.75 $4.50 $4.25 $4.00 $3.75 $3.50 $3.25 $3.00 $2.75 $2.50 $2.25 $2.00 $1.75 $1.50 $1.25 $1.00 $0.75 $0.50 $0.25
EV $0.25 $0.48 $0.68 $0.85 $1.00 $1.13 $1.23 $1.30 $1.35 $1.38 $1.38 $1.35 $1.30 $1.23 $1.13 $1.00 $0.85 $0.68 $0.48 $0.25
Pick
Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
Game Continued
You have now indicated your most preferred lotteries. We would now like to find out what
you think are the best and worst lotteries. Below we have presented a table just like you saw
on the previous screen and have indicated the lotteries you selected with the word “Picked”.
That is, if you selected Lottery A than you would see the word “Picked” located in the cell
above it.
Using the radio buttons in the row marked “Best” below, please indicate the lottery you
think is the best of all the lotteries by clicking on the radio button underneath your favorite
lottery. After you have selected the lottery that you think is the best, use the radio buttons
in the “Worst” row to indicate the lottery that you think is the worst of all the lotteries.
55
Once you have finished selecting what you think are the best and worst lotteries, click
the “next” button to go to the final part of the HIT. You will make an additional 10 cents
for completing this final portion of the HIT.
Reminder! Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
END
Thank you for your participation! Please answer the questions below. If you do so, you will
earn an additional 10 cent bonus! If you do not wish to complete the survey. Feel free to
submit the HIT!
1. What is your Nationality?
2. Which of the following best describes your highest achieved EDUC level?
3. What is the total income of your household?
4. Why do you complete tasks in Mechanical Turk? Please check any of the following
that applies:
5. How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Instructions - Practice
For example, you are asked to select your favorite 3 lotteries from lotteries A, B, C, D and
E. The lotteries’ payoffs are as follows:
Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C Lottery D Lottery E
Prob 10 % 20% 50% 60% 80%
Prize $4.50 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $1.00
EV $0.45 $0.80 $1.50 $1.20 $0.80
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From the table above you can see that Lottery A pays 4.50 with a probability of 10%,
Lottery B pays 4.00 with a probability of 20%, Lottery C pays 3.00 with a probability of 50%,
Lottery D pays 2.00 with a probability of 60% and Lottery E pays 1.00 with a probability of
80%. What this means is that you if you select Lotteries A, C, and E you will win Lottery A
with a probability of 10%, Lottery C with probability 45%, and Lottery E with probability
36%.
Note that your probability of winning a given lottery that you select is different than the
probability of the lottery being favorable to you. This is because while you will actually win
Lottery A with 10% probability, Lottery C will only be relevant if Lottery A is unfavorable to
you (which will occur with probability of 90%). As such, the probability you will win Lottery
C is .90*.5 which is equal to 45%. Likewise, Lottery E will only be relevant if Lotteries A
and C are unfavorable to you. Therefore you will win Lottery D with probability .9*.5*.8
which is equal to 36%. What this means is that as you select lotteries that are more likely
to be favorable to you, lotteries that are even more likely to be favorable to you will be less
likely to be relevant.
Example: Suppose you select lotteries A, C, and E. The outcomes of each of these lotteries
are as follows:
1. Lottery A draws the number .2, which is greater than .1 and therefore unfavorable to
you,
2. Lottery C draws the number .1, which is less than .5 and therefore favorable to you.
3. Lottery E draws the number .8, which is greater than .8 and therefore favorable to
you.
Your earnings for the lottery part of the HIT would therefore be 3.00 dollars. This is
because the outcome of Lottery A was unfavorable to you. While both Lotteries C and
E where favorable to you, the favorable outcome of Lottery C ($3.00) is greater than the
favorable outcome of Lottery E ($0.80).
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Lottery A Lottery B Lottery C Lottery D Lottery E
Prob 10 % 20% 50% 60% 80%
Prize $4.50 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $1.00
EV $0.45 $0.80 $1.50 $1.20 $0.80
When you are asked to make your actual decisions, you will see a chart like the one shown
on the practice stage but there will be more Lotteries and there will be a box underneath
each lottery. In each of these boxes, there will be two radio buttons. One radio button
will correspond to ”No” while the other will correspond to “Yes”. The “No” button will
be indicated with a “N” while the “Yes” button will be indicated with a “Y”. You will use
these radio buttons to indicate your preferred lotteries. If a given lottery is among your 4
preferred lotteries, click the corresponding “Yes” radio button. If not, click the “No” radio
button.
Before you make your final lottery selections, you will participate in 3 practice rounds.
In each of these rounds, after you make practice lottery selections, you will be shown the
expected value of your decisions as well as your previous decisions, the probability of winning
each lottery in your selection (i.e., the probability of each outcome occurring), and the
resulting expected values of your selections. After you finish the practice stage, you will
make your final lottery selections and then complete a survey. In this final round, you will
also be shown a summary of your practice decisions and their resulting expected values and
probabilities of each outcome occurring.
As soon as you are ready, click the NEXT button to begin the practice periods.
Game - Practice
Practice Round 1: Before we begin we would like you to practice a few times before you make
your final lottery selections. After each practice selection you will be told which lotteries
you selected and the resulting expected value of your selections as well as the probability
of winning each lottery in your selection. So to begin and for practice, please indicate your
58
4 favorite lotteries. After you have indicated your 4 preferred lotteries, please click the
“Next” button to see the expected value of your selection and the probabilities of each of
each outcome occurring (in your selection). There will be 3 practice rounds. After you
have finished making your 3 practice selections, you will be prompted to make your final
selections. Your bonus will be based on your final lottery selections.
Reminder! Do not click the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
[After 3 practice period]
Final round: Please indicate your 4 favorite lotteries. These choices will be used to
determine your bonus. After you have indicated your 4 preferred lotteries, you will be asked
to click the “next” button to finish up the final parts of the HIT. However, before you make
your decision, consider the following: if you select Lotteries J, H, F, and E you will have
25% chance of 4.00, a 22.5% chance of 3.75, a 21% chance of 3.25, and a 15.75% chance
of 2.75. If you select this lotteries in expectation you would win 2.96. It is not possible to
select a different set of lotteries that have a greater expected value. Reminder! Do not click
the Submit button until specifically instructed to do so.
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